Diversity of judgments: reason and emotions in forensic practice by Tomasi, Serena
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 12: Evidence, Persuasion & Diversity 
Jun 5th, 8:00 AM - 9:00 AM 
Diversity of judgments: reason and emotions in forensic practice 
Serena Tomasi 
University of Trento 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Tomasi, Serena, "Diversity of judgments: reason and emotions in forensic practice" (2020). OSSA 
Conference Archive. 32. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA12/Friday/32 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
 1 
Diversity of judgments: reason and emotions in forensic practice 
 
SERENA TOMASI 
Faculty of Law 
University of Trento – CERMEG, Research Centre on Legal Methodology 
Via Verdi 53, Trento 
Italy 
serena.tomasi_1@unitn.it 
 
Abstract: The paper questions the role of emotions in judicial persuasion: first, we will provide a brief overview of 
the affective states, focusing on the structure of the s.c. epistemic feelings; then, we will present some experiments 
which are going to be developed in a current research-project in a local court in Italy, to understand the interpersonal 
effects of epistemic feelings on judicial persuasion; finally, we will draw conclusive reflections on the relationship 
between forensic rhetoric and emotion.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite a long-standing interest on emotions and several researches on emotional reactions and 
attitude formation, especially through psychological and cognitive exploration, emotions in 
courtrooms have received very limited attention. We know that people use their emotions to in-
fluence other people's attitudes but we tend to refer to the judge as a superman, capable of re-
maining impervious to emotional attacks and to decide on the basis of a rational logical path. The 
decision is considered to be an exercise in pure rationality and emotions are generally considered 
as irrational or disturbing factors of cognitive processing. The use of pathos is interpreted as an 
irrational tool opposed to rational proof, a diversionary strategy, and alternative to reasoning. In 
judicial reasons, the pathetic argument is excluded or evaded: therefore, deliberately, it is unclear 
whether emotional expressions indeed influence attitude formation and/or change and, if so, un-
der which circumstances such influence occurs.  
Here, we investigate the possibility that judges, as individuals, use emotions as information upon 
which to base their attitudes and their final decision.  
We argue that at the basis of the split between emotions and judgment there is a certain concept 
of rhetoric and, therefore, of persuasion. 
We believe that the devaluation of the decisive role of emotions in the judicial decision-making 
process is conditioned by the negative meaning with which we still speak of rhetoric today. A 
centuries-old tradition has accustomed us to think of rhetorical discourse as a partisan, subjec-
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tive, irrational and emotional discourse. Although the process of re-evaluation of this discipline 
has been going on for more than half a century, centuries of discredit and mistrust have marked 
an evident trace in the use of rhetoric as manipulation (Raimondi, 2002).  
The rebirth and recovery of this discipline is a complex and non-linear phenomenon: rhetoric has 
been taken up in many argumentative fields, from literature to communication, from economics 
to social psychology, up to the law. This operation took on different meanings.  
This study enhances the recovery of a rhetorical way in the legal field: this way will reject the 
dualism between emotions and judgment and consider judicial discourse as essentially emotional 
and pathetic. 
Before developing this idea, it is important to consider some definitional issues.  
The paper will therefore be divided into three parts:  
a) first, we will give a general definition of emotion, with the intention of showing an overview 
of all forms of emotional reactions. Among the affective states we will focus in particular on the 
so-called epistemic feelings, as they play a leading role in reasoning and judgment. 
b) The objective of this research is to investigate whether, and if so, under which conditions, 
judges use epistemic feelings as information and when forming their attitudes. At this stage we 
will present some experiments that will be developed in a territorial court in Italy (Court of Ap-
peal of Trento) to a sample of judges. Experiments investigate how epistemic feelings can shape 
the judicial attitudes about an object. 
c) Finally, the aim of the third part is to highlight the relationship between emotions and judg-
ment and to lead empirical experiments into a rhetorical analysis of emotions. 
 
 
2. Emotions: an overview of current research and theories 
 
Definitions of emotion vary widely: combining elements of several influential accounts, there is 
considerable consensus on a number of key aspects1. Emotions can be defined as comparatively 
short-lived, differentiated, and intense responses to events that are appraised as relevant to a par-
ticular concern or goal (Lazarus, 1991), which are directed toward a specific stimulus (e.g., a 
person, an object, a situation) and are characterized by distinct subjective experiences , expres-
sions and action tendencies. 
Emotion, from a conceptual point of view, means all forms of affective reaction to specific stim-
uli, experienced as positive or negative. It is an affective episode, which arises suddenly, sponta-
neously and which has a short duration. For instance, happiness arises when one is making good 
progress, sadness arises when one faces a loss and anger arises when one's goals are frustrated. 
Emotions arise from an individual's appraisal of the situation (Lazarus, 1991): as a situation can 
be positive or negative in many ways, appraisal is multidimensional and depends on aspects re-
lated to one's identity. According to some theories (Haidt, 2001), emotions are reactions deter-
mined by our history and culture. According to others (Prinz, 2004), there are moral emotions, 
preceding and determining moral decisions. 
These qualities differentiate emotions from moods, which are more diffuse, longer lasting feeling 
states without a clear cause or object. In contrast to emotions or feelings, moods are less specific, 
less intense and less likely to be provoked by a particular stimulus or event. People experience 
 
1 For an overviwe on the affective states and their diffence, see P. Goldie (2000, ch. 6) and J. Prinz (2004, ch. 8). 
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positive or negative: there have been many studies done on the effect of the moods on the cogni-
tive mind (Martin, E. A. and Kerns, J. G., 2011).  
Mood also differs from temperament or personality traits, which are even longer-lasting. Tem-
perament is associated with personality: it is something you are born with or acquire young and 
seldom change. Temperament lasts for the duration: it is a lifetime platform on which moods 
and emotions occur (Schinnerer, J.L. 2007). Temperaments are often vague, diffuse emotions, 
which may be contrasted with the more distinct mood and very specific emotions.  
Emotions involve feelings. According to Peter Goldie (Goldie 2008), emotions involve two kinds 
of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition 
of one’s body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one’s body 
– that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards 
the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emo-
tional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion.  
Feelings differ from full-edged emotions in two ways (de Sousa, 2009). Unlike emotions, feel-
ings can be attributed at a subpersonal level, whereas emotions are typically attributed only to 
persons. Moreover, emotions are more complex than feelings, which share four points of resem-
blance with emotions: involving evaluative appraisal; telling something about the subject and the 
object; playing a role in the guidance of intellectual activity; having a characteristic phenome-
nology. 
Emotional expressions convey information about the expresser's feelings (Ekman, 1993), traits, 
social intentions and appraisal of the situation (Ekman, 1993).  
Building on the idea that emotional expressions provide information, the s.c. EASI theory inves-
tigates the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions (Van Kleef, Gerben A.; van den Berg, 
Helma; Heerdink, Marc W., 2015). According to this model, individuals can thus acquire pieces 
of information from others' emotional expressions.  
Among feelings, epistemic feelings are those that enter into the epistemic processes of cognition. 
Epistemic feelings have attracted attention only quite recently: if it is not controversial that emo-
tions play a role in the process of deliberation, it is important to clarify more specifically what 
this means.  
A recent study indicates an exemplary classification of epistemic feelings as suggestion to under-
stand how they affect cognition, inquiry and meta-cognition. We will report here some indica-
tions to clear up their nuances (De Sousa, 2009, pp. 146-147). De Sousa lists four categories of 
epistemic feelings: 
1) wonder or curiosity: such feeling motivates inquiry about a range of questions or topics 
without assuming any clear questions. 
2) doubt: motivates inquiry but it presupposes a specific proposition or existing beliefs. 
3) certainty or rightness: it is the opposite of doubts. This feeling blocks any inquiry because 
we may feel we have the answer we are looking for. Certainty about one proposition does 
not preclude further inquiry into other questions. Very close to the feeling of certainty, 
which focuses on propositions, we face with the distinct feeling of trust, which regards 
persons. Strictly speaking, trust is not an epistemic feeling, but because of the importance 
of testimony in the formation of most of our beliefs, De Sousa argued worth including it. 
4) familiarity: it is a metacognitive feeling that induces us to believe that we know 
something before we are able to retrieve what we know.  
What is most remarkable about the epistemic feelings is the complexity of their mechanisms be-
cause they normally escape awareness. They lie below the level of conscious deliberation: epis-
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temic feelings seem to serve precisely the function of providing premises elaborated at the sub-
personal or intuitive level for use in explicit inferences (de Sousa, 2009, p. 152). So they deter-
mine a process that is functionally equivalent to making an inference, even though no explicit in-
ference is made. 
Epistemic feelings play a leading role in reasoning and judgment. In our daily life, we could find 
more examples of these affective states that guide our reasoning and our actions.  
Suppose we believe true that the professor of philosophy of law at the Faculty is an upright per-
son: how can we believe this information to be true? Where do we get this information? This in-
formation is derived from specific epistemic sensations, such as the feeling of certainty.  
Suppose someone claims that the coronavirus is incurable and that we will never be able to have 
a vaccine: faced with this proposition, the feeling that many would have is uncertainty. 
The evaluation of information is never neutral but is accompanied by sensations that tell us, for 
each piece of information, if it is certain / uncertain, evident / doubtful, true / false, known / un-
known, familiar/unfamiliar. 
The theorists of epistemic feelings point out that when we think, we process information: our 
feelings participate in the cognitive process. The information, that is the object of our thinking is, 
in fact, perceived as obvious, interesting, questionable, familiar, unknown, related to others, etc. 
Our thinking is always combined with sensations, which are not expressed in inferences and, 
therefore, not evident. 
The fact that we consider information as obvious / doubtful / true / false / certain / uncertain / 
surprising / boring / known / unknown depends on our personal epistemic feelings. 
We believe that this category of feelings shows a further aspect of the role of emotions compared 
to cognitions: to ensure a good understanding of what people say and of social situations, the use 
of rationality and the examination of reasons and motivations exposed is insufficient. It is neces-
sary to penetrate the reasoning and analyse the feelings that underlie people's behaviour. In the 
same way, being aware of our emotional regulation allows us to fully understand our thinking 
and to enjoy our emotions without falling victim to them. 
Perceiving emotions is indispensable in the cognitive process: for their analysis and control.  
This ability must be exercised by everyone, both in the interpersonal relationship and in the per-
sonal rethinking. 
In legal field, it is conceivable that arguments may be perceived by the judge in a certain way 
depending on his own epistemic feelings, which undermine and trigger the argumentation devel-
oped by the parties.  
Epistemic feelings are used in judicial cognition, as they are in everyday arguing, but it is un-
known their practical relevance.  
To investigate the effects of such epistemic feelings on judicial attitudes, one direction that we 
believe would be particularly interesting is the empirical research, aimed at reconstructing the 
decision-making process in some specific law-cases and, in particular, re-evaluating information 
on the basis of  epistemic feelings in order to finally understand how much one's feelings may af-
fect cognition and inquiry in judgment. 
In the next section we will report on an experiment that will be developed in Trento (Italy), with 
the collaboration of a sample of judges operating in a territorial Court. The research project is 
funded by the Faculty of Law of Trento and the Trento Bar Association. Due to the Covid health 
emergency, the experimental research has been interrupted  and will be resumed compatibly with 
the safety measures. For this reason, in this paper, we will indicate one of the tests, without being 
able to discuss now the expected results. 
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3. Experimental studies on epistemic feelings in judgment 
 
The objective of the present research is to investigate whether, and if so under which conditions, 
judges use their own epistemic feelings as information when forming the decision. The topic of 
origins and relations of the epistemic feelings is highly relevant but still under-researched.   
Vogl et al. (2019) is a handful experimental study addressing several epistemic emotions to in-
vestigate their origins and effect, exploring both within-person and between-person data.  This 
present study will not replicate those findings. The present research question is novel and rele-
vant for judicial reasoning: we focus on detecting the use of epistemic feelings and their impact 
in the decision-making process. The experimental perspective of analysis is that of legal argu-
mentation, as developed in the frame of forensic rhetoric studies, in Italy, by Cermeg (Research 
Centre on Legal Methodology)2.   
The perspective is pragmatist, by taking into account how facts, values, knowledge and errors are 
intertwined in the legal reasoning. Looking at the practice and the experience of judging, forensic 
rhetoric proposes a model based on rhetoric to reduce the gap between judgment as it is and what 
it should be. According to this model, the rhetorical procedure does not involve the loss of ra-
tionality but rather enriches the criteria in a movement that tends to include rational, ethical and 
emotional factors. How should the judge decide in a reasonable way?  According to this theory, 
the judge should take into account the speeches of the parties, analyse them and evaluate them 
according to different criteria: topical adequacy, relevance, logical coherence, dialectical cor-
rectness and persuasive commitment.  
The model must be integrated to deeply understand the role of emotions. We chose to focus not 
on emotions in general but on the four classes of epistemic feelings: while we may be able to as-
sess the validity of deductive arguments set out in the judgment, we may be not be able to 
achieve the complete analytic understanding of the judicial process. Knowing the basic epistemic 
feelings means acquiring a deep knowledge about fundamental dimensions of emotion affecting 
cognition.  
The method of research will consist in an interview: judges will be asked to review their deci-
sions through specific questions that will help them understand how information was processed. 
Through a process of reverse appraisal, the judges-observers will may infer epistemic feeling in 
relation to a particular object and evaluate what feelings they may incorporate in their attitude 
about the object and measure how much they affect their inquiry, cognition and meta-cognition. 
For instance, the feelings of knowing include the judgment that one has learnt something. That 
means there is an implicit, unconscious and automatic process consisting in retrieving infor-
mation from memory: this provides guidance on further choices. But we don’t know anything 
about the accuracy of the sensory output of this research. Such feeling provides an indication but 
we don’t know if it is or not reliable because the process of retrieving information is not explicit-
conscious or controlled. 
Based on this logic we propose to the judges, who participate in the research, to review the deci-
sion process, detecting the epistemic feelings and evaluating their use and their effect on reason-
ing. 
 
2 See Manzin (2020), Puppo (2020) and Tomasi (2020). 
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The participating judges will be recruited on a voluntary basis from the judges of the territorial 
court of Trento. Both judges and public prosecutors will participate as decision-makers in the re-
search project. Each magistrate is asked to select at least one recent provision (order or sen-
tence), including the motivation part. All instructions and questions will be presented through the 
computer. The approach is straightforward: we will ask participants about their attitude toward 
that object, the parties and the lawyers assisting the parties. Participants will be instructed to 
carefully rethink about the judgment, the context, and work experience, personal relationships 
with the parties and with the lawyers, memories and intuition. They would be asked some ques-
tions about it. Through the questions, we will explicit internal states, including emotional reac-
tions and attitudes. Participants will also rate the applicability of each epistemic feeling, from 0 
(not applicable) to 5 (very applicable). We will collect more data by increasing the number of 
judges and the number of provisions to be re-analysed for each judge.  
Questions are asked in such a way as to obtain an immediate and spontaneous response from the 
judge: there is a risk that the judge, in analysing her own decision-making process, will not be 
willing to recognize her own epistemic feelings as a source of information. For this reason, we 
will provide questions about facts and objects that are related to epistemic feelings. We design 
patterns of questions aimed at understanding if the effect is more likely due to the information 
inherent in the epistemic feelings.  
In this paper, we will present an extract of the questionnaire, dividing the questions related to the 
classes of feelings. 
 
Epistemic feelings Questions Yes/No Answers  If yes: 
scale 
0: none 
1: low 
3: moder-
ate 
4: high 
5: very 
high 
wonder During the discussion, was the 
speech attractive? 
During the discussion,  
were you impressed by the voice or 
the gestures of the lawyers? 
Did you write the decision at 
home? 
Did you write the decision in the 
office? 
Did something or someone disturb 
you during the discussion of the 
parties? 
Did something or someone disturb 
you when writing the decision? 
Did the parties' speech intrigue 
you? 
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doubt Was the speech easy to under-
stand? 
Did you have doubts about the reg-
ulatory framework? 
Did you have doubts about tha 
facts? 
Did you consider a premise as ob-
vious? 
 
 
 
  
rightness Did you consult sources other than 
the case documents? 
Did you consult databases for the 
decision? 
Did you consult internet for the de-
cision? 
Do you think you left out some da-
ta or information? 
 
did you recognize a topic as 
strong? 
 
  
familiarity Did you know the parties? 
Did you know the lawyers? 
Did you know the topic of the 
case? 
Have you ever pronounced on this 
matter? 
Did the case remind you of some-
thing? Did the case remind you of 
someone?  
 
 
  
 
The questions are simplified and are designed to make the participants reflect on emotions and, 
above all, on the factors on which emotions depend. For this reason most of the questions con-
cern external situations from which meanings can be inferred. 
In an ensuing study, it would be necessary to deepen the answers and ask the judges if they per-
ceived emotions during the writing of the sentence, if they are able to recognize the emotions and 
if they perceived one or more epistemic feelings. The judges should therefore describe the con-
text of emergence of the affective state and qualify it.  
Therefore, the questionnaire can also be used as a tool for critical review of one's cognitive pro-
cess. A deficient or incomplete perception of emotions has repercussions on the ability to under-
stand social situations and other people's behaviours (see Dellantonio and Pastore on allesitimic 
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situation). Recognizing emotions is the prerequisite for regulating them and to applying any 
strategies based on emotions. Each of us has more or less developed emotional regulation abili-
ties: the questionnaire may lead us to understand whether we have used any emotional infor-
mation and to maintain control over them. 
 
 
4. On forensic rhetoric 
 
 
Researches on epistemic feelings reveal that information is processed not only with reasoning 
but also affectively. Our cognitive processes are never purely logical, as information is accom-
panied by sensations that tell us something (if it is certain, uncertain, evident, doubtful, true, 
false). Therefore, the fact that we consider certain information as certain/uncertain, true/false, ev-
ident/doubtful, familiar/unfamiliar, may depend not on what we have hard but on our epistemic 
feelings.  
Such feelings exist, cannot be eliminated and cannot be clearly separated from reasons because 
they are part of the reasoning. We believe that such experimental tests concerning epistemic feel-
ings contribute to understanding the 'good reasons of emotions' (Plantin, 2011).  
Pathos is not an accessory or an irrational element, but contributes to the construction of persua-
sive discourse. Emotions are a complex phenomenon: the arguments, the way of speaking, the 
context in which the argument takes place provoke an emotional reaction, which guides our de-
liberation. 
The relationship between emotions and judgment should not be understood solely in the sense 
that emotions are capable of distorting or influencing speech. When analysing a judgment, the 
analysis would include a set of elements, which do not end in the product, but which extend to 
the discursive process. Therefore, knowing what kind of person is the one who acts, what rela-
tionships he or she has with the parties, what story he or she has are relevant elements for delib-
eration. 
The category of epistemic feelings and their impact on deliberative practice undermines those 
models developed by some modern psychological theories of persuasion which maintain a sub-
stantial dualism between rational and irrational processes.  
Epistemic feelings show that the processing of a certain cognitive content also depends on sensi-
tive conditioning.  
I am referring in particular to the so-called Elaboration Likelihood Model, ELM, designed by 
Petty and Cacioppo (Petty, Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). This model aims to identify which routes lead 
us to change our attitudes and, more exactly, what type of cognitive processing is required for 
this to happen. According to Petty and Cacioppo, this change in attitude can take place through 
two differentiated routes, which are mutually exclusive: the central route and the peripheral 
route. The first is a process of careful elaboration of information and reflection on arguments; the 
second is based on elements that are not directly relevant to the topic but that are background in-
formation, or peripheral signals, such as the attractiveness of the source, the motivation to give a 
positive impression of oneself.  
Starting from this dichotomy, the authors identify two different cognitive routes that are per-
ceived as alternative, in the sense that mutual interferences are not foreseen. This distinction, 
prima facie, could recall the Aristotelian classification about rhetorical proofs and, in particular, 
the distinction between logos, ethos and pathos. One might think that the central route of the 
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ELM coincides with the logos, and that ethos and pathos are the peripheral signals. But this is 
not the Aristotelian perspective, as it has been correctly revised by Francesca Piazza's studies on 
Aristotle (Piazza, 2015).  
Ethos and pathos are not in the ‘suburbs’ of cognition and are not an alternative route: logos 
ethos and pathos are not alternative or parallel ways of persuasion but interlaced.  
Aristotle, also, admits the existence of peripheral elements of persuasion, in the sense of irrele-
vant, but does not necessarily identify these elements with the emotional aspects relating to the 
speaker or listener. In the rhetorical model, Aristotle conceives of persuasion as a unitary process 
in which the emotional state of the speaker and listener fully participates. In the Aristotelian per-
spective, the speaker and the listener are not external to the discourse, but actors who participate 
and construct a discursive situation. In other words, persuasive discourse is not only the message 
that is produced but is the result of a process in which the speaker and listener play a constitutive 
role.  
What is said is one of the elements that make up the speech, but there are other circumstances, 
such as the emotional state of the speaker to be investigated. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The affective states are an aspect that modern theories of legal argumentation do not take into 
adequate consideration. The analytical attention is always turned to the discourse as it appears in 
the sentence: but this discourse is the result of a more complex process.  
If we decide to rely on the decision maker, based on what information do we say he is a correct 
person? Let's take into consideration his competence, his reliability, his honesty: this is not irra-
tional but it is strategic. We may also just follow our own feeling that when we talk about judges 
we refer to someone highly reliable. 
Only an authentically rhetorical perspective enhances the emotional dimension of the judicial 
discourse. 
Any attempt to bring the judicial reasoning back to a mathematical proof is a failure: judgment is 
a rhetorical discourse in all respects and rhetoric is the relationship between emotions and judg-
ment. 
This study constitutes a first step to sensitize judges, by including them in the experimental activ-
ity, to the possibility of elaborating the information affectively. By ‘affectively’, we do not only 
mean pleasure / displeasure but something more complex, as believing that you know something 
because you feel that. Feeling plays a fundamental role from an epistemic point of view. 
The analytical apparatus of argumentative theories in the legal field must be integrated on this 
profile.  
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